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1968] FRAUD IN SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 599
cause the primary burden of implementation must be borne by the
medical profession, continual scrutiny should be given to attitudes
and developments within that profession which may demand amend-
ments or additions to the law, in order to maintain its alignment with
standard medical opinion and practice.
H. HUGH STEVENS, JR.
Securities Regulation-Fraud in Securities Transactions and
Rule iLob-5-A Survey of Selected Current Problems
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It is not uncommon to turn to the financial pages of any daily
paper and find that more than ten million shares were traded the
preceding day on the New York Stock Exchange. This volume is
staggering and the monetery value of these transactions would be
in the realm of 508 million dollars. However, this is only a partial
picture because other stock exchanges and over-the-counter markets
contribute to the total daily volume of securities transactions.
The need for governmental regulations to insure a market free
of fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative devices was recognized
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by Congr6ss shortly after the depression. This recognition led to
the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 19331 and, its com-
panion, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 Contained within
the Exchange Act are several anti-fraud provisions. Section
10(b) 4 prohibits any person, by means of any instrumentality of
interstate commerce or by the use of a national securities exchange,
from employing any manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances
violative of the rules and regulations that the Securities and Exchange
Commission' may prescribe. This section is operative only if imple-
mented by rules and regulations of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission [hereinafter referred to as the SEC], the agency created in
1934 to administer the growing body of federal securities statutes.
Acting under the authority of section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, the SEC adopted 'rule 10b-5 6 which is a general anti-fraud
provision couched in language that is not noteworthy for its clarity
or precision. From this broad rule a body of federal anti-fraud
law has developed and proved itself as an adaptable and effective
weapon to prevent and rectify fraudulent dealings in interstate se-
curities transactions.
This comment will examine the expansive treatment accorded sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5, attempt to articulate the present re-
quirements to maintain a successful rule 10b-5 cause of action under
current court interpretation, and hopefully afford insight into the
current trends of rule 10b-5 development and some idea of its outer
limits.
1 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 a-aa
(1958).
'Securities Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 a-jj
(1958) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
'E.g. § 17(a), § 15(c)(i), § 10(b).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78i (b) (1964).
'Hereinafter cited as the SEC.
a 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made not mislead-
ing, or(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
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I. THE PARTIES TO A SECTION 10(b)"AND RULE lOb-5 ACTION
The maintenance of a section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 cause of
action for fraudulent securities activity has been liberally allowed
as to who may qualify as a party plaintiff and against whom the
action can be brought. The rule itself declares that the suit may be
brought against "any person" who engages in the prohibited con-
duct; and even though the rule is notably silent in this regard, the
courts have placed few restrictions on who may bring the action.
A. The Rule 10b-5 Plaintiff
It is well settled that the Securities Exchange Commission, a
corporation,7 and a private individuals may bring a rule lOb-5 action
if they have been defrauded by or through the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, the mails, or a national se-
curities exchange in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. The rule lOb-5 plaintiff is further required to prove that
the fraud is "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
This phrase has been interpreted to require that the plaintiff must
either be a purchaser or a seller in a securities transaction affected
by the fraud. This limitation-imposed by judicial interpretation-
seems inconsistent with the words of rule 10b-5 (3) which prohibit
engaging "in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate on a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Here the rule refers to
a fraud on "any person" rather than a purchaser or seller. However,
the remaining words, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
"A stockholder's derivative action initiated on behalf of a defrauded
corporation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security has been
judicially allowed. See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24(2d Cir. 1964) ; McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961) ;
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).8 It has never been decided by the Supreme Court that a private right of
action exists under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, but, with the ever in-
creasing mass of case law allowing such an action, it should be a moot ques-
tion. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa. 1947).
'E.g. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (in-
dividual plaintiff ruled neither purchaser nor seller) ; Pacific Insurance Co.
of N.Y. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (corporate plaintiff ruled
neither purchaser nor seller); Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
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security," when read in connection with the legislative history re-
ferring specifically to those persons who purchase or sell,'0 seem to
support this limitation.
The purchaser-seller requirement seems justified where a cor-
poration or an individual is seeking damages, because to allow a
non-purchaser or a non-seller to collect damages suffered by another
would unjustly enrich the undamaged claimant." It should be noted
that a few cases and commentators in this area have argued to
abolish the requirement that plaintiff always be a purchaser or seller,
especially in suits seeking injunctive relief from a violation or a
threatened violation of rule lOb-5.1' The argument for relaxation
is particularly strong in the case of a corporate issuer of the securi-
ties who wishes to prevent manipulation and fraudulent transfers
of its stock and to protect its shareholders from this fraudulent ac-
tivity.'" Here, without relaxation of the purchaser or seller rule,
the corporation must stand by and watch its shareholders damaged
by the results of the previously threatened activity. The dubious
danger that may result from relaxing the purchaser or seller require-
ment is the threat of injunctive suits designed only to harass the
threatening group or only to preserve the control of a certain faction.
Thus the purchaser or seller requirement seems to assure that the
plaintiff was in close proximity to the alleged fraud, has actually
suffered damages, and is seeking damages in general good faith.14
o Furthermore, if an invester has suffered loss by reason of illicit prac-
tices, it is equitable that he be allowed to recover damages from the guilty
party. With these considerations in view, the bill provides that any per-
son who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or who induces
transactions in a security by means of a false or misleading statement
in the report of a corporation, shall be liable in damages to those who
have bought or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or
statements.
Sen. Rep. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1934).1 This contention is well expressed in Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256
F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" See, e.g. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., C.C.H., Fed. Sec.
L. Rep., 91,983 (2d Cir. 1967); Note, Private Enforcement under Rule
10b-5: An Injunction for Corporate Issurer., 115 U. PA. L. REv. 618 (1967).
It is also noteworthy that in the injunctive suit the "Congressional intent"
support for limiting plaintiffs to purchasers and sellers is lacking because
this support referred only to an action for damages. See Footnote 10 and
accompanying text.13 Defiance Industries, Inc. v. Galdi 256 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
is an example of this fact situation arising.
"' See in this regard Note, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An
Injunction for a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv. 618 (1967).
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(1) Who is a Purchaser or a Seller?
There are of course the simple clear cut cases of a person who
sells (exchanging securities for money or other valuable considera-
tion) or purchases (obtain securities by paying a price or other
valuable consideration) securities in the usual sense of the word.
However, some recent cases have gone beyond the usual meaning
attached to "purchaser" or "seller" in four significant ways. One
example is found in the "aborted seller" cases which hold that a
person prevented from selling due to fraud practiced upon him can
maintain a lOb-5 action. 5 This theory was recently extended to the
"aborted purchaser" in Goodman v. Hentz'0 where the court said
that the rule lOb-5 language ("in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities") was not limited to completed purchases or
sales, but applied to transactions in which the plaintiff would have
been a purchaser or seller but for the fraud."
Secondly, the category of rule 10b-5 plaintiffs has been ex-
tended by the doctrine of the "constructive sale" and the "involun-
tary seller." In Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Company,:'
the plaintiff was classed as a defrauded seller when his stock in a cor-
poration was converted following a fraudulent merger. The court
held that the merger was a "constructive sale" of plaintiff's stock.
In a similar fact situation the court in Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Company 9 held that plaintiff was an "involuntary seller" when he
was forced to convert his shares because of a fraudulent short-form
merger.
A third expansion has occurred where the plaintiff is considered
a type of third-party beneficiary seller. In one such case the bene-
ficiaries of a trust were deemed to be sellers of securities sold by
the trustee and were thus allowed to bring a rule lOb-5 action. 0
Finally, the cases hold that if a corporation is defrauded into
1 See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
M. L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packing Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27(E.D. Pa. 1954) (where purchaser breached a contract to buy for fraudulent
purposes and the court held that the "aborted seller" could maintain an ac-
tion). The Exchange act was amended in 1964 to include a "Contract to
Sell" in its definition of a "sale." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1964).
" 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).171d. at 444.
18241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
'. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
'
0 Rippley v. Denver Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966).
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issuing securities it can maintain a rule lOb-5 cause of action, if
otherwise qualified, as a defrauded seller.21 This fourth development,
one which has probably had the greatest impact, has resulted in
opening the courts to a sizeable, heretofore denied, class-the cor-
porate plaintiff. In addition these cases, holding that a corporate
issuer of securities is a seller and that a corporation purchasing stock
is a purchaser,22 settled the previously unanswered question of
whether the purchaser or seller also had to be considered an investor
in securities. These cases clearly held that at least where the cor-
p6ration was the plaintiff it did not also have to be an investor.
The recent case of A. T. Brod & Company v. Perlov? held that an
individual plaintiff need not be classified as an "investor." Here a
broker who purchased stock for an account at his customer's direc-
tion was deemed a purchaser (in this case he could also have been
an "aborted seller") and thus able to bring a rule lOb-5 cause
of action even though he clearly was not an investor.
Dicta in the Vine and Brod cases may have significant future
impact on the purchaser or seller requirement. In both, the SEC
submitted an amicus curiae brief attacking as too narrow the limita-
tion of rule lOb-5 plaintiffs to "sellers" and "purchasers," i.e. direct
victims of the fraud. The court in Vine responded:
(T)he Commission advances the alternative argument that the
plaintiff need not even be a selling stockholder to sue under
10b-5, so long as the Rule has been violated and plaintiff's stock
has lost value as a result.... In view of our disposition of this
case, it is unnecessary to deal with this interesting contention.2 4
In neither Vine nor Brod did the court adopt the SEC's interpreta-
tion but found that the plaintiff was a purchaser or seller. There is,
however, some judicial support for the SEC's position in the recent
case of Entel v. Allen.25 Here defendants' motion for summary
"E.g. Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964);
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960);
Globus, Inc. V. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Cohen v. Colvin,
266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"E.g. New Park Mining Co. v. Cramer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
"0 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). See also note 43 infra and accompanying
text.
' 374 F.2d at 636.
" 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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judgment was denied although plaintiff was dearly neither a pur-
chaser nor seller. The court stated:
In view of Vine and Brod and the position taken by the S.E.C. it
may well be that the purchaser-or-seller requirement of Birn-
baum will not be followed when the question is next presented to
the Court of Appeals.
2 6
B. The Rule 10b-5 Defendant
Both section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 expressly state that "It will be
unlawful for any person"2 7 by certain means to engage in the pro-
hibited conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity. This language is broad enough to preclude any attempt to
limit its scope as was done judicially in regard to the requirement for
the rule lOb-5 plaintiff.28 However, early interpretations of the
rule required that a 10b-5 defendant be in privity of contract with the
plaintiff. This requirement apparently stemmed from a forced in-
terpretation of the language of the rule itself. The rule makes it
unlawful for "any person" to engage in any act which would operate
as a fraud on any person "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." The courts apparently thought "in connection with the
purchase or sale" meant that the defendant had to be in contractual
privity or on the other side of the transaction from the plaintiff.2 9
This concept grew more and more unpopular as it became obvious
that the privity-of-contract limitations should be relaxed to protect
the public in an expanding securities market.
The first judicial departure was the "conspiracy doctrine" sub-
jecting "fringe" defendants (not in direct privity with the plaintiff)
to rule 10b-5 sanctions. Under this doctrine, if the person could be
shown to have conspired against the plaintiff in violation of rule
lOb-5, he could be made a defendant provided that the plaintiff and
any one of the co-conspirators were in privity.30
The move away from the privity of contract requirement has
-°Id. at 70.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
2 As has been seen the defrauded or deceived "any person" has been
construed to mean a person who is either a purchaser or a seller. See foot-
notes 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying text.
"' Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952); Donovan v. Taylor,
136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
" Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Thiele v. Shields, 131
F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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progressed to such an extent that today the requirement has been
practically abolished 31 and the rule lOb-5 defendant can be literally
"any person."
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF A SECTION 10(b)
AND A RULE lOb-5 CAUSE OF ACTION
Since rule lOb-5 is an anti-fraud provision, it is not surprising
that its interpretation and application have been influenced by the
requirements of common law fraud and deceit. Thus, any study of
the substantive elements of a rule lOb-5 cause of action has to be-
gin with an examination of these common law requirements and an
inquiry into which of these have been eliminated, retained, or modi-
fied in their application to a rule lOb-5 cause of action.
A. Common Law Elements for Proof of Fraud and Deceit
There are five common law elements usually required for proof
of fraud or deceit: (1) a false representation (2) of a material fact
(3) made with knowledge (scienter) of the falsity for the purpose
of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it, and (4) the plaintiff must
have relied on it (5) to his detriment. 2 While it is generally ac-
cepted that a rule lOb-5 plaintiff need not prove all the elements, the
courts have been faced with the problem of determining precisely
which are and which are not necessary elements. 8 To some extent
the answer may depend upon the nature of the defendants conduct
and how the rule itself expresses its prohibition against a particular
practice.
B. The Rule 10b-5 Anti-Fraud Provisions: Scope and Use
It is, of course, settled that the plaintiff must allege and prove
that defendant has engaged in one of the actions or omissions pre-
scribed by the rule. Rule lOb-5 (1) makes it unlawful for anyone
"to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud."3 4 Rule
"
1E.g. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., C.C.H., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.,
91,983 (2d Cir. 1967); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307
F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Lorenz v. Watson 258 (F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
'23 Loss, SEcuRlaEs REGULATION 1431 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as Loss].
"Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Berko v. SEC,
316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258
F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
3,17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1).
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lOb-5 (2) forbids one "to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading. 31 5 Thus subsection (2) prohibits not
only the outright lie but, more importantly, it prohibits the half-
truth which is literally true as far as it goes but must be qualified
or expanded to avoid being misleading. An example would be a
statement, made in order to make the stock attractive, that the cor-
poration had just finished drilling ten oil wells without disclosing
that all ten were dry. Subsection (2) requires the speaker to make
certain that no present or subsequent outside circumstances render
what has been said false and misleading. It should be noted that
the only affirmative duty to speak under subsection (2) is to clear up
a misleading statement already made. Thus, where one maintains
complete silence there seems to be no general duty to disclose and no
liability under rule lOb-5 (2); but this is subject to the develop-
ments to be discussed below.
Rule lOb-5 (3) makes it unlawful to engage in any act, prac-
tice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person. Subsection (3) covers fraud in
the form of non-verbal acts such as reducing a corporation's divi-
dends to drive down the price of the stock in order to purchase it
more cheaply. This subsection and to some degree subsection (1)
have provided the basis for an interesting development in fraud under
rule 10b-5. The common law imposed liability in deceit for complete
non-disclosure (as distinguished from half-truths) only if the
nondisclosure was of a material fact and utilized by a person in a
position of trust or fiduciary obligation to the injured party.3 6
Through subsections (1) and (3) a foundation has been laid for an
analgous action under section l0b and rule lOb-5. Since these sub-
sections deal with non-verbal behavior" they are relied upon to pro-
hibit total silence where this silence would be misleading or operate
as a fraud. However, the common law qualifications to this action
were also carried over into the action under rule lOb-5; the nondis-
closure must be of a material fact and the nondisclosing person
must be under a duty to disclose. Thus, the affirmative duty to dis-
close material facts, as distinguished from the general duty to speak
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2).
M 3 Loss 1434-5; Strong v. Repide 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
Subsection (2) requires some verbal statement in its operation.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the truth if one speaks at all, has been imposed only on persons
who under the rule could be considered in the position of an "in-
sider." This cause of action subjects this select group to liability
because of their position of trust and the recognized disparity in
knowledge and bargaining position between the "insider" and an
outsider. 8 The necessity for incorporating a cause of action against
insiders for nondisclosure into rule 10b-5 was urged on the courts
on the basis of strong public policy foundation and the need to cover
the many impersonal exchange and over-the-counter transactions
where the parties are more vulnerable to fraud by omission.8
As mentioned above, the acts which constitute rule lOb-5 fraud
are not restricted to the strict requirements of common law deceit
but are being expanded to carry out more effectively the purposes of
the anti-fraud provision. Until very recently cases held that rule
10b-5 fraud was limited to those types of fraudulent practices usually
associated with the purchase or sale of securities; in so holding those
cases exempted from rule lOb-5 coverage acts which could be classi-
fied primarily under state law as breaches of general fiduciary duty,
fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and simple breach of
contract.4 ° This limiting definition of rule lOb-5 fraud now seems
completely overridden by several cases. SEC Chairman Cary,
in Cady, Roberts & Company4" stated that "these anti-fraud pro-
visions are not intended as a specification of particular acts or prac-
tices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass
the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be
taken of investors and others." 42
The enlargement of rule 10b-5 coverage beyond the usual and
common place fraudulent securities transactions is illustrated in
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow.4 3 Here a stockbroker brought a rule
10b-5 action against one of his customers who allegedly intended
only to pay for ordered securities if the price went up by the pay-
ment date. The court said that rule lOb-5 was designed to reach not
"SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963);
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"' List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
"oE.g. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
4140 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
I2 Id. at
48375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
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only frauds usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities
and relating to the investment value of the securities but also to
"prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, whether artifices employed involve a garden type
variety of fraud or present a unique form of deception."4 4 In
Glickman v. Schweickart & Co.4" the court similarly held that the
rule was not limited to misrepresentations relating to the subject
matter of the purchase but also included misrepresentations con-
cerning the means of financing the purchase.
Ruckle v. Roto American Corporation0 exemplifies the applica-
tion of rule 10b-5 sanctions in the traditional state law area of
breach of fiduciary duty. Here a minority director was allowed to
bring a derivative action under rule 10b-5 against the majority di-
rectors who had concealed a material fact at a directors' meeting
at which sufficient shares were issued to the president of the cor-
poration to permit him to maintain his control. The corporation was
held to be a defrauded seller within the meaning of rule 10b-5.4 7
In the recent case of Entel v. Allen4 s the court stated:
If an undisclosed scheme to breach State contract law is encom-
passed by Section 10(b) and Rule 16b-5, then an undisclosed
scheme to breach a state corporate fiduciary law must also be
covered.49
The limits upon the use of rule lOb-5 as a general remedy, to
enforce state law fiduciary duties may be gathered from recent
case law, although it must be stressed that these limits are in flux
and are still evolving. In Carliner v. Fairlanes, Incorporated,50
and in O'Neill v. Maytag,"1 for instance, the courts held that many
state law actions for breach of fiduciary obligations do not involve
any deception; for a breach of fiduciary duty to violate rule 10b-5,
however, some deception must be present. McClure v. Borne Chem-
ical Company,5 2 on the other hand, articulates the broadest ground
"Id. at 397.
' 242 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
"To similar effect see McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824
(3d Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1960).
48270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Id. at 70.80244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
81339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
8292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
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for using rule 10b-5 as a general remedy for breach of fiduciary
duties. In the Third Circuit's view, the Exchange Act of 1934
deals with the protection of investors, primarily stockholders. It
creates many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to the com-
mon law. It expresses federal interest in management-stock-
holder relationships which heretofore have been almost exclusively
the concern of the state. Section 10(b) imposes broad fiduciary
duties on management vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual
stockholders. As implemented by Rule lOb-5 and Section 29(b),
Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent weapon
for the enforcement of many fiduciary duties. 3
McClure's sweeping interpretation of rule lOb-5 as a general and
virtually unlimited federal remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty has
not met with judicial acceptance. Thus, in Entel v. Alle 4 plaintiff
alleged that dominant shareholders and insiders caused the corpora-
tion to sell its stock at less than its fair market value. The court said
that the issue "posed by this case is whether it is sufficient for an
action under rule lOb-5 to allege a breach of one of these general
fiduciary duties where breach does not involve deception."''  In
answer to this question the court, citing Brod, held that rule 10b-5
would
prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a
garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of decep-
tion. Novel or atypical methods should not provide immunity
from securities laws. 6
In summary, the great weight of authority is that a cause of ac-
tion under rule lOb-5 is not limited to those frauds usually as-
sociated with the purchase or sale of securities but can be used to
5 Id. at 834.
270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
';rId. at 69.
"' Id. at 70. The support which the Entel case gives to the proposition
that rule 10b-5 can only be relied upon to enforce a state law breach of
fiduciary duty when the breach involves deception is somewhat obscured by
the facts and determination of the case. In Entel the plaintiff was suing both
privately and derivatively. The court found there was no deception practiced
upon Atlas for whom plaintiff was suing derivatively, but it denied defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment without distinguishing between
plaintiff's private rule 10b-5 claim which involved deception and his deriva-
tive claim which did not. Thus, it appears that the courts reference is only
to plaintiff's private claim where deception was present since the court made
it clear that it considered the element of deception necessary to enforcement
of a breach of fiduciary duty under rule 10b-5.
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police all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities regardless of how unique or uncommon the fraud or
deception might be. Under this expanded concept of coverage rule
10b-5 is increasingly available to attack breaches of fiduciary duty
involving fraud or deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security ;T but the limitations that may inhibit recourse to rule
10b-5 have not yet been fully determined.
C. The Duty of Affirmative Disclosure
It has been noted that rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for "any
person" to engage in any prohibited act set forth in the rule,58 and
it is clear that "any person" could include the corporate director or
the comer grocer. Although the prohibitions of rule lOb-5 in gen-
eral apply equally to any person there is one notable exception. Rule
10b-5 has been interpreted to impose the special duty of affirmative
disclosure of material information only upon a limited class of per-
sonsP--those generally classified as "insiders." This affirmative
disclosure requirement is probably the single most important weapon
in the anti-fraud arsenal provided under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.
The affirmative duty to disclose imposed on insiders derives both
from judicial interpretation of rule 10b-5 and from the recognition
that corporate insiders, as fiduciaries, enjoy a privileged position of
access to special knowledge about the affairs of their corporation.
Under this approach, rule 10b-5 enforces a policy of fair play by
nullifying any unfair advantage the insider has over the uninformed
outsider or minority shareholder.60
The development of the "insider's" duty of disclosure reached
5
,See, e.g., Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).8See notes 27-31, supra, and accompanying text.
' This duty of affirmative disclosure is distinguished from the duty im-
posed by rule lOb-5(2) which does not require disclosure but requires only
that an actor who elects to speak must speak the truth. See Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 767 (D. Colo. 1964).
" Corporate insiders are also subject to a common law liability for fraud
and deceit when purchasing or selling securities. This common law liability
extends to innocent misrepresentation through half truths as well as false-
hoods. In some cases under the common law an insider has been held liable
for nondisclosure when by reason of special facts a duty of disclosure existed.
See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). Although some common law
protection exists, rule lOb-5 is broader in its coverage, requires less proof,
affords better venue and broader service of process, and provides a federal
forum.
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its maturity in the case of In re Cady, Roberts & Company."' The
court established that non-disclosure by insiders was an "act, practice
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person" and applied the rule to securities transac-
tions occurring over the exchanges as well as to face-to-face transac-
tions.
(1) Who is an Insider?
In imposing rule 10b-5 liabilities on insiders, including the
duty of affirmative disclosure, the Cady Roberts case stressed
the existance of a relationship giving access directly or indi-
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second,
the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing. 2
Examination of this pronouncement discloses two basic facts which
must be present in order to invoke the affirmative duty to disclose:
first, the presence of the special relationship in which the defendant
is privy to the internal affairs of the corporation, and second, the de-
fendant's use of this position and information for personal benefit.
"Insiders" meeting the Cady Roberts test are not limited to the
obvious officers and directors of a corporation. In Cady Roberts the
SEC held that a corporate director's business partner who received
information of a dividend reduction from the director knowing it
had not been released to the public was in a special relationship and
privy to the internal affairs of the corporation through the director.
Thus, the court held the partner liable as an insider who had failed
in his duty to disclose and had used the information for his own
benefit.63 This test was expanded in the celebrated Texas Gulf
Sulphur case614 where the court extended the label of "insider" to
employees in positions of responsibility within the corporation; and
in Ross v. Licht65 the court found that close friends of insiders
could themselves be insiders when they utilized information fed to
them from a director in purchasing securities from outsiders without
8140 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
"Id. at 912.
"A more recent court has held to similar effect in List v. Fashion Park,
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
" SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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disclosing that there was to be a public offering of the corporate
stock which was certain to increase its value.
Ross v. Licht66 went further and pointed out that even if all
the elements were not present to hold these close friends insiders
they could be held liable as "tippees," i.e., persons who have know-
ingly received information from insiders in breach of the insider's
duty of trust and as such would be subject to the same duty of dis-
closure as insiders.6" Licht went still further and said that "in any
event .... [the friends] would be equally liable with the other de-
fendants for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 0Mb-5."" s
Both the Cady Roberts test for an "insider" and the "tippee" and
"aider and abetter" tests presented in the Licht case extend the spe-
cial duty of disclosure to an ever increasing class of persons. Under
these tests it would seem very likely that even the wife and family of
an insider or persons who pick up material information in the course
of business negotiations with a corporation will be treated as insiders
themselves and subject to the duty of disclosure. Cases have held
that a broker who purchases on behalf of an insider on information
furnished by the insider is subject to the duty of disclosure6 9 as
is a corporation dealing in its own securities.70 Under the Licht and
Cady Roberts tests, it would seem that if an outsider overheard
several directors in the next booth at a restaurant speak of 'the de-
velopment of a revolutionary manufacturing process, he would not
be considered an insider. This is because the inside material infor-
mation was not gained from any special relationship giving the out-
sider access to corporate affairs. However, suppose an outsider
wire-taps the director's conference room, or, with an intent to gather
privileged information, follows the directors to the restaurant and
obtains material information which he attempts to use to his ad-
vantage without disclosure. Here, the outsider would probably have
an affirmative duty to disclose or be completely barred from using
this ill-gotten information on the grounds that he could not cure
6 d.
7 Id. at 410. See also in this regard 3 Loss 1450-51.08263 F. Supp. at 410. Other cases have held defendants liable for viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 on grounds of aiding and abetting a rule lob-5 violation.
E.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676-681(N.D. Ind. 1966) ; Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21, 28
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1965).
7oSEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
3 Loss 1453.
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wrongful acquisition of material information by mere disclosure.
Because of this element of conscious wrong-doing courts could im-
pose the duty of disclosure on the outsider by holding that the out-
sider has placed himself in a special relationship with the corporation
or in the position of an insider or forced "tippee."
However, despite this apparent trend toward expanding the
definition of "insiders," two similar cases have taken an extremely
narrow and unrealistic position. In both, an outsider seeking con-
trol of a corporation sent out tender offers to the corporation's
shareholders. In Mills v. Sarien Corporation,71 the potential pur-
chaser did not disclose to the shareholders that on gaining control he
planned to sell the assets of the corporation at a large profit. In
Mutual Shares Corporation v. Genesco,72 the purchasers failed to
disclose the true value of the corporation's real estate which they
knew to be undervalued. In both cases the courts refused the
plaintiffs' rule lOb-5 complaint on the grounds that the defendant
was technically an outsider and as such did not have a duty of dis-
closure. In each case the defendant was successful in gaining con-
trol of the corporation. It would seem that the first share an outsider
purchases under a continuing program to gain control is just as
important to his effort as the share that puts him into control or into
the position of an insider. The seller who sold to this individual,
technically an outsider at the time, seems to be in just as great a
need of knowledge of the true facts as the sellers to this purchaser
after the program progresses to the degree that the purchaser is a
technical insider. The duty to disclose should relate back to those
who were the first to trade with this purchaser under the continuing
program of acquisition even though he was then a technical outsider.
In Sarfen the court said that the duty to disclose only relates to in-
formation obtained by virtue of an inside position as distinguished
from that information taken from an outside position into an inside
position. This reasoning is subject to attack in that when any cor-
poration is incorporated or reincorporated all the immediate infor-
mation available to it has been generated from outside positions.
No court would hold his information nonprivileged and exempt from
the duty to disclose by those who are now insiders.
The inherent unfairness to the early sellers in the above situation
133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., 1 91,983 (2d Cir. 1967).
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and the wide opportunity for fraud that it presents has evoked the
drafting of the Tender Offer Disclosure Act"8 which passed the
Senate on 30 August 1967. This Act would establish a duty of dis-
closure in regard to tender offers and in essence treat the technical
outsider or, more correctly, the insider candidate as a true insider
during his bid for control.
The Cady Roberts test for an insider has a second required ele-
ment which consists of proof of the use of inside information to the
benefit or economic gain of the insider.74 In Cochran v. Channing
Corporation,7 1 Judge Dawson pointed out that non-disclosure by an
insider was not enough but had to be accompanied by defendant's
use of the information. The same was required by the court in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company.76 In this case the SEC al-
leged that defendant Texas Gulf Sulphur should be held liable for
non-disclosure of material information in connection with the pur-
chase of securities. The court pointed out that the defendant cor-
poration did not utilize the information to its own advantage or to
the advantage of its officers or directorsY.7
There appears to be one notable exception to this rule. Several
cases hold the defendant liable for non-disclosure of material infor-
mation on the basis of aiding and abetting. In Pettit v. American
Stock Exchange8 the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy among all defen-
Exchange and its officers aided, abetted and assisted the illegal dis-
" Tender Offer Disclosure Act of 1967, S.510, Aug. 30, 1967. See CCH
Fed. Sec. Law Rep., No. 164, Sept. 7, 1967.
""Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d. 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
' 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
258 F. Supp. 262, 293-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
It is interesting to note that the courts in interpreting rule lOb-5 in
regard to a corporate defendant's non-disclosure of material information have
found no liability when the information was not used by the corporation to
its advantage. By doing so, the courts are applying the same standards ap-
plied to individual insiders even though the corporation is clearly in a dif-
ferent position. Corporations, in general, have a duty under state law, re-
gardless of any corporate trading, to disseminate material corporate infor-
mation to the public and its shareholders. The individual insider has no such
state law duty. The reason this state law duty has not been carried over into
the requirements under rule lob-5 is probably due to federal recognition of
the "business judgment rule" used by state courts as an exception to the cor-
poration's broad duty to disseminate corporate information. This rule im-
ports to corporate decisions (in this case the decision not to disclose) a
legitimate purpose and puts them above reproach unless some ulterior profit
seeking motive is demonstrated. See Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp.
239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"8 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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dants and specifically alleged that members of the American Stock
tribution of stock by failing to take the necessary 4isciplinary action
against known breaches by insiders of the obligation imposed by
rule 10b-5 of disclosure. The court said:
Since knowing assistance of or participation in a fraudulent
scheme under Section 10(b) gives rise to liability equal to that
of the perpetrators themselves, the facts alleged by the trustees,
if proven, would permit recovery under Section 10(b).70
On the other hand, members of an accounting firm who knowingly
prepared false financial statements and failed to disclose this knowl-
edge were not held liable as "insiders" because plaintiff failed to
prove that they had either used the information to their own ad-
vantage or were aiders and abettors to those who had utilized the
undisclosed information. 0
In summary, the use of the aiding and abetting basis for liability
will subject borderline defendants to liability without the necessity
of the proof of their own utilization of the non-disclosed informa-
tion. If the theory of liability is based on their being "insiders" or
"tippees" it will require the further proof of a personal utilization of
the non-disclosed information to their advantage.
(2) Implementation of the Duty to Disclose
The "insider's" duty to disclose rule presents several practical
problems in its implementation." One is the dilemma of the insider
who wishes to trade in the securities of his corporation but possesses
material information which should not be disclosed for the good of
his corporation. In this situation the insider must either stay out
of the market in order to remain safely mute or disclose the infor-
mation in order legally to trade in his corporation's securities. The
only real alternative for this insider is the former for only then can
he honor the duty of non-disclosure owed to his corporation and at
the same time avoid any breach of his duty running to those with
whom he might trade.8 2 In situations where there are no legitimate
business reasons requiring a period of non-disclosure of material in-
791 d. at 28.
80 Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 195-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'This duty has been said to apply "regardless of the sophistication or
naivete of the person with whom they are dealing" List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
This dilemma is discussed in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457(2d Cir. 1965) and In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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formation the insider is not under the influence of the conflicting
duties presented above. Here the insider may actively trade in his
corporation's securities as long as he makes full disclosure of all
material information or waits until the information is released
through regular corporate channels.
The insider who wishes to trade faces the additional problem
of how to disclose. It is evident that in face-to-face transactions
direct disclosure is available; but since this duty also applies when
an insider trades on a national exchange, 3 the insider must in es-
sence disclose to the public at large since it is impossible to determine
whose securities are involved when the insider is buying or who is
the purchaser if the insider is selling. Chairman Cary, in the Cady
Roberts case, dealt directly with this problem and said that:
the New York Stock Exchange has recognized that prompt dis-
closure of important corporate developments ... is essential for
the benefit of stockholders and the investing public and has estab-
lished explicit requirements and recommended procedures for the
immediate public release of dividend information by issuers
whose securities are listed on the Exchange. 4
In the Cady Roberts case public disclosure was accomplished by
means of the Dow Jones News Ticker Service, Wall Street Journal
and by telegram to the New York Stock Exchange, in the Texas
Gulf Sulphur case, however, disclosure was accomplished (to the
satisfaction of the court) by mere presentation of the information
at a gathering of representatives of appropriate national news media.
It seems that any method reasonably calculated to reach the public
at large will be deemed sufficient disclosure.
While disclosure of the material information by appropriate
means satisfies the insider's duty and will enable him to enter into
securities transactions, the question of when the disclosure becomes
effective remains. In Cady Roberts the defendant insider sold his
shares at 11:15 a.m. and 11:18 a.m.-after the telegram of dis-
closure was sent to the New York Stock Exchange but before it
was received by the Exchange and before it went out on the ticker
across the country. Chairman Cary said that the insider must "keep
out of the market until the established procedures for public re-
"' See note 61, supra, and accompanying text; List v. Fashion Park,
Inc. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th
Cir. 1960).
"' in re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961).
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lease are carried out instead of hastening to execute transactions in
advance of, and in frustration of the release." 5 This apparently
establishes a "time-to-absorb" rule which requires the insider to
wait until the effect of the news has reached the public and has been
absorbed by it."8 The Texas Gulf Sulphur case supports a less strict
"announcement" rule which allows insiders to trade safely once the
material information has been announced in the channels of public
dissemination. The court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case rejected
the urging of the SEC to adopt the "time-to-absorb" rule and to
establish a reasonable waiting period. The court pointed out that a
rule requiring an insider to wait a certain time until the public ab-
sorbed the information would not prevent a representative of the
news media or a wire service employee from using this information
during this "time-to-absorb" period. Emphasising the difficulty of
applying such a rule involving an uncertain standard, 7 the court
adopted the "announcement" rule as the easiest to enforce and the
clearest to interpret by both court and insider.
There is no apparent majority following for either of these rules.
Perhaps the only safe course is the voluntary imposition of the
"time-to-absorb" rule.
D. Materiality and Rule 10b-5
Both the general obligation to make material information truth-
ful when voluntarily disclosed by any party to a securities transaction
under rule lOb-5 (2), and the additional duty of affirmative dis-
closure imposed on an insider--discussed in detail in the preceding
section-under lOb-5 (3), turn on the presence or absence of a ma-
terial fact. The definition of materiality will be the subject of this
section.
In Cady Roberts the court held that a planned future dividend
cut was clearly a material fact since it had a direct effect on the
market value of the securities and on the judgment of the in-
vestor."' Judge Bonsal in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case declared
that an extraordinary mineral discovery was a material fact. From
85 Id. at 915.
"G The "time-to-absorb" rule discussed in Insider Trading in Stocks, 21
Bus. LAW. 1009 (1966); Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate In-
formation Practices; The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sdphur Pro-
ceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271 (1965).
""SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
" 40 S.E.C. at 911.
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these two examples it can be safely predicted that information con-
cerning an increase in future dividends, a radical increase or de-
crease in current earnings, an important product discovery, or an
unexpected depletion of resources would receive similar treatment.
Except in these obvious cases, however, the classification of facts
as material or immaterial merely on the basis of their similarity to
a previously adjudicated set of circumstances is at best pure specu-
lation.
The courts as well as the SEC have attempted to establish gen-
eral guidelines, applicable to all information, to determine ma-
teriality. Rule 405 promulgated by the SEC under the 1933 Securi-
ties Exchange Act says that the term "material" means "the infor-
mation required to those matters as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
security registered."8 9 Similar to the SEC's definition is that used in
the opinion of several leading cases in this area 0 which refer to
a material fact as one that would materially affect the judgment of
a reasonable man in the transaction. It is significant that these two
tests tie "materiality" to the reasonable man as distinguished from
the individual plaintiff. Some recent cases have departed from
the above definitions to a more restrictive test of those facts "which
in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of
the corporations stock or securities."'" The court in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, in adopting the "affecting market value" test rather than
the broader "affecting judgment test," made the following statement:
It is appropriate that management's duty to disclose under rule
10b-5 be limited to those situations which are essentially ex-
traordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to have a
substantial effect on the market price of the security if dis-
closed. A more rigorous standard would impose an unreasonable
burden on management in its securities trading. -9 2
The two tests are similar in that generally those factors which
would affect the judgment of the average investor will, if disclosed,
89 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(k) (1) (1956).
00 Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1966); Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Corp., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
" List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Kohler
v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" 258 F. Supp. at 280.
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affect the market value of the security as well. But there are obvious
examples where a nondisclosure will be deemed material under the
"affecting judgment" test and not material under the "affecting
market price" test. 3 The latter test has been criticized as unreliable
and irrelevant in determining materiality, a criticism was well ex-
pressed in Rogen v. Ilikon Corporation,4 where the court in re-
jected that test:
It is not at all unlikely that rumors of the discussions between
Ilikon and Reynolds did, indeed, affect the price of the stock but
that is not controlling. I can take judicial notice of the fact that
the stock market not infrequently reacts even to entirely un-
founded rumors. Accordingly, I rule, as a matter of law, that
Reynolds' negotiations were not material and there was no duty
to disclose them to the plaintiff.95
The "affecting market value" test is markedly more advantageous
to the insider than the "affecting judgment" test since it provides
a clearer guideline for him to follow and appears not to be as re-
strictive of insider trading. Efforts have been made to modify the
"affecting the market value" test to eliminate the weakness exposed
in the Rogen case. In order to insulate the reliability of this test
from the normal fluxuations and unjustified reactions of the market,
the Texas Gulf Sulphur court added to this test two additional fac-
tors: (1) the undisclosed information must be "extraordinary in
nature" and (2) must have a "substantial effect on the market
price."' 6
The test of materiality applicable in rule lOb-5 causes of action
"
8E.g. A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). In this
case the defendant, outsider invester, was found in violation of rule 10b-5
for ordering stock from the broker-plaintiff under a fraudulent and undis-
closed scheme to pay only for the shares if the price went up by payment date.
While this case predicated defendant's liability on section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 (1) which make it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud" in connection with the sale or purchase of any security, the court
made the general statement that neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 "con-
tains any language which would indicate that those provisions were intended
to deal only with fraud as to the 'investment value' of securities.. . ." 375
F.2d at 396-7. Although the court here was dealing with the materiality of
facts involved in a scheme to defraud practiced by an outsider and found li-
ability under rule 10b-5 (1), this case is an example of circumstances where
there would have been no finding of materiality in the scheme to defraud if
the "affecting market value" test had been used.
"250 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1966).
"Id. at 116.
"258 F. Supp. at 280.
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is evidently in a state of flux. Any prediction as to which test a
specific court would use might have to be based on the prevalent test
used in the particular circuit and the personal sentiments of the judge
involved. If the balance of the judge's sentiments lean toward the
protection of the unknowledgeable investor above all he is likely to
apply the "affecting the judgment of the reasonable investor" test.
On the otherhand, if the judge fears placing too great a restraint on
insider trading he will probably choose to utilize the "affecting mar-
ket value" test.
Under rule lOb-5 the information involved must be a "fact" as
well as material. Facts are generally considered to be things done,
existing, and real. The untrue statement of a material fact or the
non-disclosure by an insider of a material fact will, under the proper
circumstances, incur liability under rule 10b-5. In Goodwin v.
Agassiz9 7 the court said that a "theory" as to the possible existence
of copper deposits on the corporation's property was not a "fact"
because the theory lacked the certainty of a clear strike or discovery
of ore. Similarly, in the recent Texas Gulf Sulphur case the court
said that trading on "hopes" that the drill hole might lead to a
copper mine was not a material fact. 8
In any discussion of "material fact" it must be recognized that
the two words support each other and thus cannot be easily sep-
arated. This is evident in the "opinion" and "speculation" areas.
When an individual has an opinion it is usually based on some
existing "fact," e.g., the corporation is currently buying up certain
land. If from this obvious fact the individual speculates that the
corporation may have made an important discovery of ore, his sub-
sequent trading in the corporation's stock is based merely on per-
sonal opinion or speculation. In the above example, the opinion
was not based on a material fact because the fact was too remote to
have influenced the market or the reasonable investor.99 It has also
been held that information of a "possible opportunity to sell" cor-
porate assets, revealed to an insider during the course of preliminary
negotiations, are facts that are "too remote to have influenced the
07283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
258 F. Supp. at 283.
0This was the exact situation presented in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case
(258 F. Supp. at 283). Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.,
226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Il. 1964) also holds that "opinions" are not to be
considered as a material fact.
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conduct of a reasonable investor." 0 However, if the directors of
two corporations have reached an agreement on a merger, then cer-
tainly this is a fact and is material; but
where negotiations have just commenced and the parties have
established no operating guidelines, such as a favorable rate of ex-
change for the stock of one company, it can be argued that in-
siders should still be able to trade. Under these circumstances,
the insider is not in possession of any information which dearly
places him in a position superior to that of the average investor,
and he would seem to be incurring the normal market risks.' 0'
Cases are also consistent in holding that the desire to sell, plans
to sell, and even resolutions to sell corporate assets are not material
facts until a final decision has been made.10 2
The interplay between what is material and what is a fact for
purposes of rule lOb-5 appears to explain the seemingly arbitrary
April 9th date set in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case as a line separating
information that was not a material fact from information that was.
Prior to April 9th there were rumors that Texas Gulf Sulphur had
made an enormous copper strike. This information, if true, would
have significantly affected the market value of the stock or an average
investor's judgment; it would thus have been deemed "material."
The character of the information was at all times "material" but it
was only on April 9th that this "material" rumor was changed from
rumor to fact. The materiality of the information remained the
same but when the rumor was confirmed by results of tests it be-
came a material "fact."
In connection with the Texas Gulf Sulphur ruling as to what
constituted a material fact, the court distinguished a "material fact"
from an "educated guess." The question was presented to the court
as to "whether information which may have a special significance
to an insider because of his professional background, is material"103
to him when it would not be material to an unknowledgeable per-
son. The court agreed that because of specialized knowledge and
ability a person may be able to make an "educated guess" that would
... List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 1965).
10. Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
..
2 E.g. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); James
Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 264
F.2d. 445 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 250 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass.
1966).
10. 258 F. Supp. at 283.
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be more reliable than an uneducated guess. But the court stressed
that until the information became material to the public so as to have
a substantial effect on the market value of the securities it would not
be material for anyone. If the court had accepted the proposed ex-
ception to the general rule of what constitutes a material fact it
would have, in essence, punished an individual for superior intel-
lectual ability and background. Furthermore it would have dis-
couraged these educated persons from investing in their own cor-
poration by subjecting them to a duty to disclose their educated
guesses which, if, ultimately wrong would possibly subject them to
rule 10b-5 liability. Thus the question posed in the Texas Gulf
Sudphur case-whether special knowledge in an area will change
normally irrelevant information into material information-was
answered in the negative.'
E. Scienter and Rule 10b-5
Although the strict requirements of common law fraud and de-
ceit have not been incorporated into section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
the courts are still preoccupied with them. There is, for instance,
disagreement over a possible requirement that the defendant must
have knowingly or intentionally violated the rule, i.e., that scienter
is an element of 10b-5 action.
Those courts requiring scienter have generally based their con-
tention on the presence of the words "defraud," "fraud," and "de-
ceit" used in clauses (1) and (3) of rule 10b-5. It is said that the
common law origin and requirements of these words must be con-
sidered when interpreting their meaning under the rule. The absence
of any of these words in clause (2) would seem to dispense with
any requirement of scienter in its application; but these courts
have rebutted this argument, probably for the sake of consistency,
by pointing out a similarity between rule 10b-5(2) and section
12(2).105 Section 12(2) provides a remedy specifically for a buyer
against a seller for untrue statements and misleading omissions, but
allows the defendant-seller to defeat the section 12(2) cause of
action if he proves he did not know or could not have reasonably
known the falsity of his statements. These courts hold that since
section 12(2) and rule 10b-5(2) are both designed to prohibit
10 The same result was reached in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
1or 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1969).
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virtually the same type of fraud and since the element of scienter is
incorporated into section 12 (2), it is also necessary to read scienter
into the cause of action based on rule 10b-5 (2). The courts point
out that without such an interpretation there would be no practical
need for section 12(2) and it would be rendered mere surplusage.' 00
The courts which hold that scienter is not required in a rule
10b-5 cause of action base their reasoning on the abandonment
of the strict common law elements of proof in rule 10b-5 actions,
the purpose of the anti-fraud provisions, the literal wording of the
rule itself which does not specifically call for such a requirement,
and the wording of clause (2) which does not even refer to fraud
or deceit..10 Support for this view may have been taken from SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Incorporated0 8 which was heard
by the Supreme Court and involved the Investment Advisor's Act
of 1940. In this case Justice Goldberg emphasized that
Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which
operates 'as a fraud or deceit' upon a client, did not intend to re-
quire proof of intent to injure and actual injury to the client.
Congress intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to be
construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purposes
of avoiding frauds', not technically and restrictively, but rather
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.10 '
It must be recognized that the Capital Gains case not only dealt
with another act but involved an action instituted by the SEC.
Many courts take the position that the requirements of proof and
the elements of a cause of action should be less stringent in
SEC-initiated actions under 10b-5 than in suits brought by individ-
uals under the implied private 10b-5 cause of action. This distinction
was made in the recent Texas Gulf Sulphur case where the court,
after recognizing the possible scienter requirement imposed on the
defendant in private enforcement suits, specifically stated:
... See, e.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Col. 1964).
Note, 63 Mica. L. REV. 1070 (1965).
07 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Dack v. Shanman 227
F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers
Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
108 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
..
9 Id. at 186. Given the close similarity of the language of section 202 of
the Investment Advisor's Act and that of rule 10b-5, this decision is signifi-
cant for the possible similar treatment the Court might afford rule 10b-5
and the element of scienter.
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In this proceeding by the Commission it is immaterial whether
Clayton [the defendant] intended to deceive or to defraud anyone
or whether he knew at the time that his purchase would violate
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 10
The conflict has not been settled. Professor Loss in his authori-
tative work in this area 11 supports the view that the courts should
read into the rule a requirement of scienter in private suits" 2 and
recent cases seem to lean in this direction. 31 However, even if proof
of scienter is required in private suits it does not necessarily follow
that proof of actual intent to defraud will be required. The concept
of scienter has been expanded to include imputed knowledge where
the defendant has acted in a reckless manner in failing to keep him-
self informed. 4 This "watering-down" of the doctrine of scienter
seems to ease what might otherwise be an impossible burden of proof
on the plaintiff and appears to be an acceptable compromise between
the two absolute and divergent extremes.
F. Reliance and Causation under Rule 10b-5
(1) Reliance
Under the common law a plaintiff bringing a cause of action for
fraud or deceit was required to prove that the alleged fraud or deceit
had been relied upon and was the cause of plaintiff's alleged harm."
The rule l0b-5 cause of action is not founded on these common law
elements; thus, the extent to which proof of reliance and/or causa-
tion is required for a lob-5 action is dependent upon judicial inter-
pretation of the rule. The elements of reliance and causation are
independent: there can be situations where the defendant's mis-
conduct is relied upon but is not the legal cause of the plaintiff's
injury and situations where defendant's misconduct was not relied
upon by the plaintiff but is clearly the cause of plaintiff's injury.
From analysis it appears that causation (the defendant's mis-
1 258 F. Supp. at 286.
' See note 32 supra.
' 3 Loss 1766. However, Loss was writing prior to the Capital Gains
case.
'2"E.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Richland v.
Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Parker v. Baltimore Paint and
Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Col. 1965); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242
F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"" See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Col.
1964) ; 3 Loss 1440-1.
.See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
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conduct in fact causing the plaintiff's injury) should be the
key to plaintiff's recovery and the controlling element in a rule
10b-5 cause of action. The element of reliance by the plaintiff seems
to play only a supporting role. The presence of reliance will always
go to prove that the plaintiff's actions (active or passive) were
prompted by the defendant's fraud, but it will not absolutely prove
that any subsequent injury to the plaintiff was in fact caused by the
defendant's fraud or wrongdoing. This "supporting role" theory
was adopted in List v. Fashion Park, Incorporated,10 where the
court said:
the test of reliance is whether the misrepresentation is a sub-
stantial factor in determining the course of conduct which re-
sults in [the recipient's] loss. The reason for this requirement,
as explained by the authorities cited, is to certify that the con-
duct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury.'
Similarly, in West v. Zurhorst,"8 reliance was held to be a re-
quirement because the plaintiff's loss must be proximately caused
by the defendant's fraudulent scheme. These cases also point out
the dispensability of reliance when the defendant's wrongdoing
forces plaintiff into a position of harm or where the plaintiff's con-
duct would be irrelevant to proof of causation in fact. This latter
situation was well illustrated in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Com-
pany,11 where plaintiff-shareholder was held to be a defrauded seller
because misrepresentations of the defendant made to other members
of the class of shareholders caused a forced sale of plaintiff's shares.
The court in granting relief said:
What ever need there may to show reliance in other situations...
we regard it as unnecessary in the limited instance when no voli-
tional act is required and the result of a forced sale is exactly that
intended by the wrongdoer.1 20
In Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation'2' the ma-
jority shareholders of two companies brought about a merger by
use of fraudulent and deceptive devices and caused a forced sale of
plaintiff's stock at a price below its true value. In plaintiff's rule
118340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
" Id. at 462.
.. C.C.H. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,968 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"' 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
" 'Id. at 635.
1'241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
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10b-5 action the court was faced with the defense that plaintiff had
failed to allege reliance on the deceptions; it answered that causa-
tion was clearly present and that in this situation reliance would be
inferred from the fact that when plaintiff purchased her shares, she
did so relying on the good faith and honesty of the defendants in
their present and future dealings with her under her contract as a
shareholder. Thus, it is apparent that reliance either is not required
at all or in some instances is imputed where it would not help in de-
termining whether the defendant's fraud in fact caused plaintiff's in-
jury. In other words, the courts do not require reliance where the
defendant's fraud would injure the plaintiff and render him utterly
defenseless to prevent injury by any course of conduct.
Although reliance may be dispensable when the plaintiff's conduct
is irrelevant to his injury, it may prove to be indispensable where
plaintiff is prompted into action or inaction by the defendant's
wrongdoing. This would be the case where the defendant in an effort
to gain control induces the plaintiff to sell his shares by misrepre-
sentations of material facts indicating that it was a seller's market
when in fact it was not. However, the plaintiff may disregard this
misrepresentation, rely on his own knowledge and research, and de-
cide to sell to the defendant. In this case if the plaintiff suffers a
loss it will not be due to the defendant's efforts. Thus, there would
be no liability due to the absence of a causal relationship between
plaintiff's injury (here self-induced) and defendant's wrongdoing.
Only by demonstrating that the fraud of the defendant prompted the
action, could the plaintiff maintain a rule lOb-5 action.
Many cases simply state that reliance is necessary without giving
their reasoning. In Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Incorporated122
the plaintiff purchased securities at an unwarranted high price that
resulted from deceptive publicity sent out by the defendant-seller.
The court held that all that was necessary for a rule lOb-5 suit was
that plaintiff allege reliance on the misrepresentations of the de-
fendant, the purchase of securities, and resulting injury. In the ma-
jority of cases which require plaintiff's allegation of reliance without
qualification, the facts are usually such that the plaintiff could con-
trol his own conduct which led to his injury. 2 3
Rule lOb-5 causes of action based on breach of an insider's duty
1 C.C.H. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
"' This would not be the case had the defendant's wrongdoing involved
manipulation of the value of the stock itself.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of disclosure present unique reliance situations because there is no
outward manifestation of the defendant's conduct upon which
plaintiff can be said to have relied. Courts requiring a showing of re-
liance in non-disclosure cases generally agree that the test of reliance
here is not whether the defendant's misconduct was a substantial
factor in determining the plaintiff's conduct but "whether the plaintiff
would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the
defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."'12 4 It is note-
worthy that this test is a subjective, personalized one that looks to
each individual plaintiff rather than the reasonable man. This allows
the defendant to engage in personality studies in order to rebut any
alleged effect that the disclosure might have had on the plaintiff.
The right to rebut the alleged likelihood of reliance would be valuable
if the defendant can show that the plaintiff is a sophisticated and
self-reliant purchaser or seller.' Thus, while the insider has the
duty to inform outsiders with whom he is dealing of all material
facts regardless of their "sophistication or naivete," he may save
himself from liability by proof that the individual plaintiff would
not have acted differently had the information been properly dis-
closed. Obviously then, the experience and self-reliance of the out-
sider may contribute greatly to the defendant's success in meeting
his burden of proof; a knowledgeable plaintiff can be said to rely
more on his own knowledge and business judgment or upon the ad-
vice of a service than the advice or disclosure of the other party to
the securities transaction.2
Defending against reliance, however, is not as easy as it may ap-
pear, especially in cases dealing with breach of ;in insider's duty of
disclosure 2 An insider stands in a fiduciary position to the de-
frauded outsider and the very nature of the fiduciary position im-
plies reliance by the outsider upon the insider's fair dealing and
124 Ross v. Litch, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1' This was the case in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1965).
126 See Rogen v. Ilikon, Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966). In this case
the court recognized the knowledge of the plaintiff as a possible ground on
which the defendant could rely to rebut the allegation of reliance.
12'This was most evident in Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 265(1st Cir. 1966) where the insider had procured a written waiver of reliance
from the outsider. The court distinguished this from a "waiver of compli-
ance" allowed by section 29(a) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(a) (1964), and held that the waiver of reliance did not constitute non-
reliance as a matter of law and would not support a motion for summaryjudgment.
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honesty. In practice, proving reliance on an insider's breach of his
duty of disclosure is often accomplished by the mere allegation of the
breach. Implied reliance can easily be found where an outsider is
personally dealing with an insider with the trust and confidence
normally assumed in face-to-face dealings with fiduciaries. How-
ever, the implication of reliance is noticeably absent when the out-
sider is dealing through a national exchange. Here the outsider
cannot be said to look to his opposite in the transaction for protec-
tion. Nor can it be said that there is any implied representation by
his fiduciary to protect his interest in the exchange transaction.
However, there has been court insistance upon the implication of re-
liance even where the sale was not face-to-face. In In re Cady
Roberts & Cornpainy,' the defendant insiders sold securities on a
national exchange without disclosure of material information. The
defendants claimed they had no duty to disclose when they were trad-
ing on a national exchange as distinguished from face-to-face trans-
actions. The court said:
We reject this suggestion. It would be anomalous indeed if the
protection afforded by the anti-fraud provisions were withdrawn
from transactions effected on exchanges, primary markets for se-
curities transactions. If purchasers on an exchange had available
material information known by a selling insider, we may assume
that their investment judgments would be affected and their de-
cision whether to buy might accordingly be modified.12 9
Here the SEC was prosecuting in behalf of the public and the court
inferred reliance on the part of the purchasing public, i.e., the Com-
mission assumed that disclosure would have affected the investment
judgment of the public, and thus that there was reliance. This case
extends the strong implication of reliance present in face-to-face
dealings between an outsider and an insider to their dealings over a
national securities exchange and at the same time reaffirms the
necessity of reliance in non-disclosure situations even if it is sup-
plied by implication.
Relance has thus far been discussed in relation to misrepresenta-
tion and complete non-disclosure. There are instances where the
defendant's wrongdoing consists of market manipulation which may
cause the price of the security to rise or fall. If a plaintiff purchases
or sells in a market that reflects this manipulation and as a result
1-2- 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
12I° d. at 914.
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suffers loss due to the manipulation, it appears difficult to deny that
plaintiff has relied on the defendant's wrongdoing. In this situation
the plaintiff has the defendant's wrongdoing forced upon him and
as a result has suffered injury directly caused by the defendant's
acts. Thus, where the defendant-insider wrongfully manipulates a
drop in the price of his corporation's securities and the plaintiff sells
his shares because of the outwardly poor prospects of the corporation
evidenced by the drop in value of the stock, the plaintiff clearly has
relied on the wrongdoing of the defendant to his detriment. I-ad
the true facts been known, plaintiff would have acted differently.
Proof of reliance is not the end of the inquiry. The plaintiff
must also prove that the reliance was justified or reasonable, such
proof necessitating a reference back to the test of reliance. This
test is "whether the misrepresentation is a substantial factor in de-
termining the course ,of conduct which results in [the recipient's]
loss. ' 3 In the application of this test it has been seen that what is
important for reliance is that the defendant's wrongdoing actually
affected the individual plaintiff's action without inquiry whether a
reasonable man would have relied. Thus, in Freed v. Szabo Food
Service, Incorporated,'81 the court recognized that the defendants
might be able to take advantage of "individual gullibility" if the
court applied the reasonable man test of plaintiff's reliance. It is un-
clear, however, how far the courts would allow a knowledgeable
plaintiff to plead reliance on a scheme that would fool only the
completely uninformed. Such reliance would indicate almost gross
negligence on the plaintiff's part. Thus, while the courts say they
do not require reliance to be reasonable, what they mean apparently
is that they will not use the "reasonable man would have relied"
test but will apply a reasonableness test gauged to the individual
plaintiff's level of sophistication. This requires that the gullible
plaintiff be no less than reasonably gullible. It may be that without
this modification the role that reliance plays in assuring the court
that the defendant has in fact caused the plaintiff's action or inaction
and consequent injury could be all but nullified by the plaintiff's
mere failure to inform himself of the obvious, thus setting up a sort
of blind reliance which would meet the test no matter how un-
justified.
10 See note 117, supra, and accompanying text.
... C.C.H. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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(2) Causation
The necessity of causation or a causal relationship between the
defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's injury in a rule lOb-5 action is
probably one of the most settled areas in section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 litigation. However, in private causes of action under the
rule there is a general dispute over the procedural requirements for
alleging and proving causation.
The case of Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation3 2
involved a private action based on rule 10b-5 by a shareholder against
his corporation and its directors for bringing about a fraudulent
merger. The merger required plaintiff to surrender his stock in the
merged corporation for a price grossly below its real value. In find-
ing for the plaintiff, the court pointed out the necessity for showing
a causal relationship between the alleged fraud and the claimed in-
jury. The court found the relationship present in that the:
frauds alleged culminated in the merger between Old Company
and New Company under which plaintiff became obligated to sell
her stock .... This could not have occured in the absence of the
frauds. 133
The court in Voege uses what is in essence a "but for" test to estab-
lish causation. Proof of causation also played a controlling role in
Hoover v. Allen,3 4 where the court adopted a "proximate cause"
test. It pointed out that even if defendants violated rule lOb-5 by
fraudulently acquiring corporate control, the fact that subsequent
damage due to corporate waste resulted from the actions of those who
gained control does not show the damage was a proximate result
of the alleged fraud. Thus the court, holding for the defendants,
found that corporate waste was not proximately caused by the
fraudulent acquisition of corporate assets. This holding, in effect,
rejects the broad "but for" test used in Voege and adopts a stricter
proximate cause test. The latter test is probably used by the ma-
jority of courts.
It must be noted that proving causation and alleging it are two
distinct things. Some recent cases have held without explanation
that the allegation of causation is an essential element to plaintiff's
. 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
183 Id. at 375-6.
...241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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complaint.' 35 These cases fail to establish whether the requirement
of allegation is satisfied only by formal words alleging causation or
whether the requirement is satisfied by merely alleging facts from
which a causal connection may be reasonably implied. This problem
was expressly dealt with in the case of Globus, Inc. v. JaroffY3
where the court held that:
the defendants may not require that such causation be proved on
the face of the complaint itself. Causation is a matter to be de-
veloped and proved at trial. What the defendants may require,
however, is that the facts alleged in the complaint are not on their
face inconsistent with any alleged or implied causation. If causa-
tion may be reasonably inferred from the facts alleged, the com-
plaint may not be rejected on the proffered ground.137
This approach, which allows causation to be implied as long as the
complaint does not rebut an implied causal relationship, seems to be
realistic and it has been supported by numerous other authorities.' a
However, in preparing a complaint it would appear to be wise
formally to allege the causal connection between the alleged fraud
and the damaged suffered by the plaintiff.
Several recent cases involve the somewhat unique causation
situation where fraudulent means are used to achieve a certain
result which arguably could have been achieved without the use of
such means. In Barnett v. Anaconda Company,139 a corporation with
seventy-three percent ownership in a subsidiary acquired all of the
subsidiary's assets. A minority shareholder of the subsidiary al-
leged that the proxy statement sent to him was false and misleading
and in violation of rule 10b-5. The court dismissed the action on
the ground that even if there had been full and honest disclosure by
the defendant the allegations of the plaintiff showed that the de-
fendant owned enough (seventy-three percent) stock to have ac-
complished the same result. Thus the requisite causal connection
between the defendant's alleged fraud and plaintiff's injury was
... Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967);
Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Cohen v.
Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1. 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"" Id. at 530.
.. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Vine v. Bene-
ficial Finance, Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967); Heilbrunn v. Hanover
Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Barnett v. Anaconda
Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).IS 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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lacking. It was also pointed out that there were no internal pro-
cedures available to minority shareholders under state law to block
the transaction. Shortly after Barnett came the case of Hoover v.
Allen.' 4" In this case the plaintiff alleged that false statements in a
proxy facilitated the passage of a charter amendment authorizing
the corporation to operate an investment company, a development
that resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The court held that the false
statement in the proxy had no causal connection with the passage of
the amendment because the dominant shareholder who advocated
passage owned two-thirds of the outstanding stock necessary for its
passage; thus, regardless of the truth or falsity of the proxy state-
ment, the amendment would have passed. The court seemed to as-
sume that there were no means by which state law could have pre-
vented the action taken by the defendants had the truth been known.
Although the results in Barnett and Hoover are much the same,
there seems to be a distinction between the two cases. In Barnett,
the court pointed out that there were no "internal procedures"
which the minority shareholders could have used to stop the
fraudulent transaction had the truth been known; in the Hoover
case, on the other hand, the court said there was no cause of action
at all available under state law to prevent the situation had the
truth been known. The possibility in Barnett that the plaintiff might
have obtained an injunction based on the unfairness of the pro-
posed action or that the Stock Exchange might not have approved
the purchase of assets had the truth been known would seem to indi-
cate some causal connection between the alleged fraud and the in-
jury. In other words, "but for" the fraud the plaintiff might have
been able to prevent the injury by injunctive relief or other available
state or exchange remedy. Thus, the court's assumption that the
fraud had no useful purpose in the transaction is suspect. The
Hoover case does not present this possible causal element. The
common basis of these two decisions, however, is that in both cases
the court viewed the solicitation of proxies which contained the ob-
jectionable material as a nonessential step in the ultimate passage of
the proposals. This position was taken to task in the recent case of
Laurenzano v. Einbender,141 where minority shareholders contended
that false proxy material was issued in violation of rule 10b-5 by de-
140 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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fendants in solicitation of a vote of shareholders to authorize the cor-
porate purchase of its own stock at allegedly inflated costs. The de-
fendants, in their motion to dismiss, contended that approval of the
transaction was obtained not by the misleading proxy material but by
their sheer voting power (sixty-five percent of the stock at the meet-
ing). In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of causa-
tion the court pointed out that any time proxies are solicited, whether
by election or because of a formal requirement, it could not be assumed
that because the result was within the control of the soliciting fac-
tion the proxies had no purpose and were a legally inert act. The
court stressed the fact that an unfavorable vote by the minority
might have affected the majority position and caused it to modify or
reconsider its position. Judge Dooling went further to state that
The misleading proxy material deprives the meeting, and the ma-
jority stockholder, of the expressions of view and the votes that
would have ensued upon truthful disclosure; it is not legally pos-
sible to decide what legal consequences flow from the informa-
tional defects in the meeting by asserting that the meeting would
have ended in the same resolutions no matter what the views or
votes of the minority. That is not necessarily the fact and it can-
not be the resolving principal of law.142
The Laurenzano case is noteworthy in that it is not only estab-
lished a rational ground for causation in a situation that seemed at
first blush to deny any causal connection; it also established this
causal relationship without relying on the presence or absence of a
cause of action or basis for relief under state law by which the
shareholder might have gotten relief had he known the truth. The
Laurenzano court called the presence or absence of a possible state
court remedy "essentially collateral" and stated that the "misstate-
ments and their effects, it would appear, should be related to the
corporate context in which proxy material functions as such and not
the outer range of their effect on the resort to legal remedies." 14
The more recent case of Weber v. Bartle" rejected as contrary to
public policy defendants' contention that there was no causal rela-
tionship between their fraud and plaintiff's injury because the
minority would have been outvoted even if the truth had been told.
However, unlike Laurenzano, this holding does not supply a basis for
11 Id. at 362.
1,3 Id. at 361.
... 272 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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finding causation but only prevents the defendant from alleging lack
of causation.
It is evident from the Laurenzano and Weber cases that allega-
tions of strict causation are not required. These cases are examples
of a general trend away from a requirement of a formal allegation
of causation. This trend was well supported by the case of Globus,
Incorporated v. Jaroff4 5 where the court held that as long as the
facts alleged were not inconsistent with any alleged or implied causa-
tion the complaint would be sufficient.14
The allegation and proof of causation, as has been seen, is a
general requirement for the maintenance of a section 10(b) and a
rule lOb-5 cause of action, with the shady area being in the detailed
requirements of allegation and proof. However, there are two areas
where this general requirement has been questioned in regard to rule
lOb-5. The first area is in suits brought by the SEC. Even though
the abolition of causation was proposed in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case147 in actions brought by the SEC, the element of causation is
still required in these cases but to a lesser degree than in private rule
lOb-5 actions. The second area in which the requirement of causation
is relaxed is in actions which seek injunctive relief rather than dam-
ages. This relaxation is necessary in most injunctive relief cases
because the damage or injury is only threatened and has not yet ma-
terialized. Thus, the courts will ignore the element of causation and
look to the imminence of the threat posed by defendant's fraud and
the adequacy of the legal remedy. Such relaxation is well illustrated
in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Incorporated.4 s Here the court
denied plaintiff's action for damages based on a violation of rule
10b-5 on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to prove any loss
and thus also any causal connection between the defendant's alleged
fraud and injury or damages. However, in regard to plaintiff's
claim for injunctive relief the court said:
[T]he claim for damages... founders both on proof of loss and
the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; on
the other hand, the claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these
issues, may cure harm suffered by continuing shareholders, and
would afford complete relief against the Rule 10b-5 violation for
1, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Fact situation similar to Lauren-
zanzo).
... See note 136, supra, and accompanying text.
147 258 F. Supp. 262, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
1,. C.C.H. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,983 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the future. "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophy-
lactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages." We, of course do not know whether plaintiffs
can prove their allegations. However, we hold that they have
stated a claim under the Act and Rule 10b-5 for injunctive relief
to prevent defendants from depressing the price of Kress stock
by market manipulation or otherwise .... 140
III. CONCLUSION
In today's economy it is apparent that wealth is shifting from
land to intangible property interests. The ownership of securities
by the average citizen is now commonplace and the context within
which we find transfers of their ownership is as broad as the indi-
vidual circumstances in which each owner or potential owner finds
himself; and more often than not these transfers involve an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or a national securities exchange.
This comment has attempted to present the current state of the
law regarding the successful maintenance of a rule 10b-5 suit involv-
ing fraud in a securities transaction, and to present in some degree
the trends in rule lOb-5 development. However, due to the infancy
of the law in this area and the daily expansion of the scope of rule
lOb-5 by courts seeking to keep pace with the times and satisfy the
public demand for a securities market free of manipulation and de-
ception, it can only be recommended that this comment be used as a
stepping stone from which the attorney can proceed to examine the
most current judicial interpretation.
ALGERNON L. BUTLER, JR.
1
"OId. at 96,345.
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